The announcement came shortly after the agency sent a team of experts to Istanbul to investigate an emergency landing Wednesday by a FedEx (NYSE: FDX) Boeing 767-300 freighter when its front gear failed to deploy.

The NTSB will meet June 6 in Washington, D.C., to hear presentations from investigators, deliberate over the draft report, and vote on proposed findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations related to the near crash on February 4, 2023.  

A preliminary report said that a FedEx 767 freighter was only 150 feet above the ground when pilots realized a Southwest Airlines jet was preparing to take off on the same runway and aborted its landing at Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (KAUS). The FedEx pilots also warned the Southwest crew to abort its takeoff. The FedEx aircraft veered sharply to the right and pulled up to avoid a collision.

In Turkey, the transport ministry said the aircraft, arriving from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (LFPG) on Wednesday morning, informed the control tower at Istanbul Airport (LTFM) that its landing gear failed to open and touched down with guidance from the tower, sliding to a stop.

Turkish authorities are leading the investigation of the incident, with the NTSB providing support. 

The aircraft involved is a 10-year-old Boeing 767. FedEx Express operates 137 B767s, more than any other jet aircraft in its fleet, according to the latest quarterly report. The airplane will be out of service for an undetermined period while the investigation continues and repairs are made, but FedEx has other planes in reserve.

FedEx said in a statement it was cooperating fully with investigators. No crewmembers were injured. 

Video of the incident shows the airplane’s back wheels touching down, followed by its fuselage, with sparks and smoke coming from its underside. 

Boeing is under public scrutiny for a series of safety incidents involving the 737 Max narrowbody and for production concerns related to the 787 Dreamliner. But manufacturers aren’t responsible for maintenance or other uncontrollable circumstances that could cause a malfunction years after an aircraft enters service.

Storm Recovery

Meanwhile, FedEx also had to deal with disruptions and damage from severe weather incidents in the United States.

The FedEx Express global air hub in Memphis, Tennessee, experienced “substantial” delays Wednesday night due to severe thunderstorms that created hazardous operating conditions, the company said in a service bulletin. It alerted customers that some packages scheduled for delivery on Thursday could arrive late. No damage was reported.

Meanwhile, a tornado slammed into a FedEx Ground facility in Portage, Michigan, on Tuesday evening, causing extensive damage. FedEx said some service delays are likely to be seen with inbound and outbound shipments across portions of Michigan, but it is diverting incoming shipments to lessen the impact on service. Several team members sheltered in place inside the facility during the storm. There were no serious injuries, the company said in a customer alert.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on FreightWaves.

The post NTSB to Deliver Findings on FedEx-Southwest Near Miss appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The $105 billion bipartisan bill, dubbed the Securing Growth and Robust Leadership in American Aviation Act, was overwhelmingly passed in an 88-4 vote. Following its passage, the Senate also approved a one-week extension to ensure the House had enough time to vote on the bill before it is sent to the President Joe Biden’s desk for final approval.

According to the Senate, the reauthorization bill “sets national priorities to strengthen aviation safety standards, grow air traffic controller [and] safety inspector workforce, implement safety technology on runways [and] in cockpits” among other initiatives. While the package does not include an amendment to increase the pilot retirement age from 65 to 67, it does contain language to increase the cockpit voice recorder length from two hours to 25 hours.

The legislation was stalled for several days in the Senate this week, primarily over provisions to increase flights into Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (KDCA) and unrelated measures proposed by some congressional leaders.

FAA reauthorization is considered the last “must-pass” measure for Congress before this fall.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post Senate Passes Five-Year FAA Reauthorization Bill appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The NTSB released its final report into the fatal April 2022 accident that occurred when the pilot was on approach to Burley Municipal Airport (KBYI). The aircraft collided with an exhaust stack that lies directly beneath the extended centerline of Runway 20. The accident happened shortly after 8:30 a.m. when it was snowing and IFR conditions prevailed.

According to the NTSB, the aircraft struck an agglomerate stack that measured 32 inches in diameter. Just beyond it was a group of six exhaust stacks. The smokestack, which is used to collect particulate emissions from the manufacturing process, is 100 feet above ground level.

According to the 24-page NTSB report, the FAA had been advised of the stacks as a potential hazard to aircraft in 2016 and had been working with the plant owner on mitigation measures. Those measures included decommissioning of the airport’s visual approach slope indicator (VASI), painting the exhaust stacks white and aviation orange to make them more visible, and adding an obstruction lighting on the tallest stack.

However, photographs of the stacks provided to the NTSB reveal no such paint scheme. 

In its 24-page final report, NTSB said its investigators, who did not travel to the accident site, could not determine if the obstruction light on the tallest exhaust stack was functioning at the time of the accident, as it was allegedly stolen from the scene by an individual who was not part of the official instigation. 

According to the NTSB report, this individual later appeared in a YouTube video with the light and discussed its use during the accident sequence. The video was shot in the individual’s home office several states away.

The local police department investigated the theft, which included reviewing the YouTube video. A copy of the YouTube video has been included in the public documents of the NTSB report. The NTSB states the YouTube individual later recanted his statements, saying the light he appeared on camera with was not the one from the crash site.

Accident Details

At the time of the accident, the Caravan pilot held a commercial certificate, had approximately 1,400 hours total time, and had been flying for less than six months for Gem Air LLC. As is protocol during an accident investigation, the NTSB reviewed the company’s training procedures.

According to the chief pilot of Gem Air, the company’s pilots were taught to use the Garmin vertical flight path indicator as an “advisory guidance” and to use the autopilot on nonprecision approaches both in VNAV and Approach mode. 

Company flight records indicated the pilot had flown to KBYI at least 12 times before the accident.

The accident happened as the pilot was attempting to fly the RNAV 20 approach, which takes the aircraft directly over the potato processing plant with numerous vent stacks constantly in operation.

The standard for airspeed after passing the final approach fix was 120 kias indicated, according to the Flight Maneuvers Description Manual (FMDM).

The FMDM also stated that “after passing the final approach fix inbound, begin descent to MDA or step-down fix, if applicable. Descent should be approximately 1,000 fpm [feet per minute] to ensure that you are at the next required altitude. Failure to make the descent to MDA in a timely manner may result in missing the opportunity to visually identify the airport in time to continue a normal descent to landing.”

The standard approach gradient for an instrument approach is 3.0 degrees. The approach plate for the RNAV 20 at KBYI notes the descent angle for the approach is 3.75 degrees. Pilots are taught that an approach gradient of more than 3.0 degrees is a good indication that there is an obstacle to avoid on the approach path. The Chart Supplement Directory for the airport noted this, using “stack” in the airport descriptor.

The steep gradient is also noted on the RNAV 20 approach plate.

The Aeronautical Information Manual warns pilots about the dangers of exhaust plumes both visible and invisible, as they can contribute to turbulence, wind shear, and reduced visibility. Pilots are advised to avoid flying over them.

Failure to Maintain Altitude

A security camera photograph showed the Caravan in a slightly nose-up attitude as it passed over the plant. A witness on the ground told NTSB investigators that the sound of the aircraft engine increased just moments before it collided with the exhaust stack.

The pilot failed to maintain altitude during an instrument approach, “which resulted in a descent below the approach path and impact with a vent stack,” the NTSB said in its conclusion determining the probable cause of the accident. “Also causal was the failure of the processing plant to correctly paint the vent stacks, which had been determined by the FAA to be a hazard to navigation due to their proximity to the landing approach path. Contributing to the accident was the likely distraction/illusion/obscuration created by steam from the processing plant, which intermittently obscured the runway.”

The post NTSB: Pilot Was Flying Too Low Before Hitting Smokestack in Idaho appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Three members of an FAA-appointed safety panel created to review Boeing’s safety culture following 737 Max crashes appeared before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee in Washington, D.C., to review its findings in a February report that were critical of the aerospace giant. 

Also testifying Wednesday in a separate hearing on Capitol Hill was Sam Salehpour, a Boeing engineer and whistleblower, who told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s investigations subcommittee that more than 1,000 Boeing 787s should be grounded due to safety risks.

• READ MORE: FAA Critical of Boeing Safety Culture

“Good engineering wins the day, but you have to listen to them,” said Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.),  who also chairs the Commerce Committee, said during the hearing to determine if there are more steps the federal government can take to ensure Boeing aircraft are safe to fly. 

In 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed, killing all 189 on board. The next year, 157 died when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed shortly after takeoff. Following the incidents, investigators determined that both crashes were attributed to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, commonly referred to as MCAS, acting on false data from a single angle of attack sensor that put the aircraft into unrecoverable dives shortly after takeoff.

In response, the FAA grounded the jets worldwide for several months while the cause of the crashes were investigated. The investigation pointed to a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of the company’s management, and what was described as “grossly insufficient oversight” by the FAA. 

The FAA panel reviewing Boeing consisted of 24 members, all considered experts in their field. Among them, Javier de Luis, an aeronautics lecturer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose sister was killed in the 2019 Ethiopian Airlines crash. De Luis noted the panel spent a year reviewing 4,000 pages of documents provided by Boeing and interviewed 250 company employees at all levels of the organization, across six Boeing locations. The effort resulted in “27 findings and 53 recommendations” for the improvement of safety at the company, he told lawmakers Wednesday.

According to the panel’s findings, Boeing has made changes since the 737 Max crashes, but there is still room for improvement. Although management tells the employees to speak up if they have a safety concern, they are reluctant to do so, fearing retaliation. Others interviewed by the panel noted that their concerns—even when raised— are ignored.

An engineer, for example, warned Boeing about the potential for lithium-ion batteries aboard the Boeing 787 Dreamliners to overheat due to thermal runaway. The Dreamliner entered service in 2011 and was grounded by FAA emergency order in 2013 due to fires from overheated batteries.

“There exists a disconnect between the words that are being said by Boeing management and what is being seen and experienced by the technicians and engineers,” de Luis said.

Following the hearing, Boeing released a statement, saying it took the FAA review panel’s critiques “to heart and will act on their findings and feedback. Since 2020, Boeing has taken important steps to foster a safety culture that empowers and encourages all employees to raise their voice. We know we have more work to do, and we are taking action across our company.” 

According to the company, employee reports through its “Speak Up” portal increased 500 percent since January, which it said indicated “progress toward a robust reporting culture that is not fearful of retaliation.”

The FAA panel released its findings in February just a few days after a Boeing 737 Max 9 experienced explosive decompression when it lost a door plug in its fuselage midflight while en route to California from Portland, Oregon.

The accident resulted in a mass grounding of the aircraft and reopened questions about the manufacturer’s process and attention to safety, including the documentation of repairs made during the production phase. It was determined the bolts that hold the door plug in place had not been reinstalled after corrective maintenance on a line of rivets in the fuselage.

Boeing was given 90 days to issue a plan to address the results and recommendations. That deadline for release of the plan is May 28.

During Wednesday’s hearing, Senator Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.) noted there were no representatives from Boeing in attendance: “We should be hearing directly from Boeing.”

The 737 is not the only aircraft under scrutiny. The 787 Dreamliner is under examination as well. 

• READ MORE: Boeing Whistleblower Wants 787 Fleet Grounded

Salehpour, who has worked for Boeing for 10 years as a quality engineer, called for a global grounding of the 787 Dreamliners, saying the shortcuts he allegedly witnessed on the factory floor during the building of 787s and 777s that may have led to the misalignment of parts in the jet fuselage. In an interview with NBC, he suggested that employees took shortcuts that may have resulted in parts of the jet being misaligned, which could lead to metal fatigue and weakened fuselage.

Boeing pushed back on those claims.

“Extensive and rigorous testing of the fuselage and heavy maintenance checks of nearly 700 in-service airplanes to date have found zero evidence of airframe fatigue,” Boeing said in a statement Wednesday. “Under FAA oversight, we have painstakingly inspected and reworked airplanes and improved production quality to meet exacting standards that are measured in the one hundredths of an inch. We are fully confident in the safety and durability of the 787 Dreamliner.”

WATCH: Whistleblower Testifies at Senate Hearing on Boeing Safety Culture

The post Boeing Workers Reluctant to Speak Up, FAA Panel Tells Senate appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Other incidents included a United aircraft engine fire, one leaving a trail of hydraulic fluid and an aircraft sliding off a runway, CNN reported.

While none of the events put lives at risk, the FAA said it is increasing its oversight of the air carrier “to ensure that it is complying with safety regulations; identifying hazards and mitigating risk; and effectively managing safety.”

• READ MORE: FAA Probe Underway After Boeing 777 Drops Wheel Following Takeoff

In a statement to FLYING, the agency noted that “certification activities in process may be allowed to continue, but future projects may be delayed based on findings from oversight. The FAA will also initiate an evaluation of United Airlines under the provisions of the Certificate Holder Evaluation Process.”

United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby addressed the issue with an open letter to customers, stating that “our team is reviewing the details of each case to understand what happened and using those insights to inform our safety training and procedures across all employee groups.”

Kirby said these changes come in addition to processes already planned, such as an extra day of in-person training for all pilots, beginning in May and a centralized training curriculum for new-hire maintenance technicians.

• READ MORE: NTSB Investigates Boeing Rudder Malfunction Incident in Newark

“We’re also dedicating more resources to supplier network management,” said Kirby.

Sasha Johnson, United Airlines vice president of corporate safety, addressed airline employees, letting them know that the FAA would be on-site for the next several weeks.

“[They will be on hand] to review some of our work processes, manuals, and facilities,” Johnson said. “We welcome their engagement and are very open to hear from them about what they find and their perspective on things we may need to change to make us even safer…We have a strong safety culture at United. Still, the number of safety-related events in recent weeks have rightfully caused us to pause and evaluate whether there is anything we can and should do differently.” 

The post FAA Ramps Up Scrutiny of United Airlines appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Today’s Top Pick is a 1946 ERCO 415-D Ercoupe.

Flying has always involved risk, but it was a particularly dangerous endeavor in its early days. As the decades progressed, so did aviation safety. Still, taking to the sky in small airplanes remained far from a safe activity, largely because loss-of-control accidents have always been common. Aviation history includes a number of designs and features aimed at making small airplanes safer, and the ERCO Ercoupe is among the more successful examples.

Designed during the 1930s by Fred Weick, who would later be instrumental in developing the Piper PA-28 Cherokee, the Ercoupe essentially combined an inherently stable airframe with limited control movements that prevented stalls and spins. The control arrangement also eliminated rudder pedals and the “footwork” that the manufacturer felt was confusing to many pilots. Relatively low power also kept pilots out of trouble. Ercoupes generally ranged from 40 to 75 hp, though a few examples received larger powerplants and many owners upgraded to more powerful engines over the years. The aircraft for sale here has an 85 hp engine.

This 1946 Ercoupe has 2,871 hours on the airframe and 305 hours on its  engine since overhaul. Avionics include a Garmin 250XL GPS/Com, GTX 321 transponder, PMA 4000 intercom, and uAvionix AV-30-C instrument.

Pilots who understand the appeal of traveling in a historically significant antique aircraft that is equally at home at vintage fly-ins or on modern airport ramps should consider this 1947 Ercoupe, which is available for $39,000 on AircraftForSale.

You can arrange financing of the aircraft through FLYING Finance. For more information, email info@flyingfinance.com.

• FLYING Magazine: Approachable Aircraft: Ercoupe
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• FLYING Magazine: The Process of Obtaining a Medical Certificate
• Plane & Pilot: Ercoupe
• The Aviation Consumer: Used Aircraft Guide: Ercoupe and Cadet

The post This 1946 ERCO 415-D Ercoupe Is an ‘AircraftForSale’ Top Pick Built For Safety appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

As the rudders are a flight control system, federal regulations require the NTSB be notified in the event of a malfunction. According to the report, the servo that activates the rudders may have been adversely impacted by the cold.

What Happened

According to the report, the jet operated as United Airlines Flight 1539 had flown from Lynden Pindling International Airport (MYNN) in Nassau, Bahamas, to KEWR in New Jersey. Shortly after touchdown the captain who was pilot flying noted the rudder pedals “did not move in response to the ‘normal’ application of foot pressure while attempting to maintain the runway centerline. The pedals remained ‘stuck’ in their neutral position.” 

• READ MORE: NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Florida Jet Accident

The captain used the nosewheel steering tiller to keep the aircraft near the centerline during the rollout as the aircraft slowed. The steering tiller is controlled by hand and used in the relatively tight quarters of the ramp.

Per the NTSB, the captain asked the first officer to check the function of his rudder pedals. The first officer reported his pedals were not responding, however, the captain then noted that shortly thereafter the rudder pedals began to operate normally.

The issue was reported to airline maintenance, and the aircraft removed for service.

The flight data recorder, which records aircraft performance data, corroborated the pilot’s statements regarding the malfunction of the rudder system. The data showed that during the landing and subsequent rollout the rudder surface position remained near its neutral position even though the force applied to the rudder pedals was increasing. 

• READ MORE: NTSB Chief Testifies That Boeing Is Stonewalling on 737 Door Plug Blowout 

The NTSB noted that “about 30 seconds after touchdown, a significant pedal force input was observed along with corresponding rudder surface movement. Afterward, the rudder pedals and rudder surface began moving as commanded and continued to function normally for the remainder of the taxi.”

The investigation involved the FAA, United Airlines (UAL), Boeing, and Collins Aerospace. It was noted in the report that the post-incident troubleshooting and inspection of the rudder control system found no obvious malfunctions with it or any of its components whose failure would have resulted in the restricted movement observed during Flight 1539 and the subsequent test flight that followed the event.

“As a precaution, the aft rudder input torque tube and associated upper and lower bearings and the rudder rollout guidance servo were removed for further examination by the NTSB systems group,” the report said.

Following the removal of the rudder system components, UAL conducted a second test flight on the airplane and found the rudder control system operated normally.

Component Details

According to the information gathered by the NTSB, “pilot control of the 737-8 rudder is transmitted in a closed-loop system from the pilots’ rudder pedals in the cockpit through a single cable system, aft rudder quadrant, pedal force transducer to the aft rudder input torque tube in the vertical fin. Rotation of the torque tube provides the command inputs to the two main and standby rudder power control units (PCUs) to move the rudder surface.”

The incident airplane was delivered to the airline in February 2023. The aircraft was configured with “a rudder SVO-730 rollout guidance servo that was disabled per UAL’s delivery requirements to reconfigure the autoflight system from CAT IIIB to CAT IIIA capability.”

Investigators stated that although the servo was disabled, it remained mechanically connected to the upper portion of the aft rudder input torque tube by the servo’s output crank arm and pushrod. The rollout guidance servo was removed from the incident airplane and subjected to cold soaking to determine if the cold had adversely affected the torque required to move the servo’s output crank arm.

Per the report, at room temperature it was found that the torque to rotate the servo’s output crank arm was within design specifications.

After the unit was then “cold soaked” for one hour and the test was repeated, it was found that the torque to move the servo’s output crank arm was significantly beyond the specified design limits.

“Because the servo output crank arm is mechanically connected to the rudder input torque tube, the restricted movement of the servo’s output crank arm would prevent the rudder pedals from moving as observed during Flight 1539 and the test flight,” the report said.

• READ MORE: Boeing Subcontractor Scrutinized Over Door Plug Failure

The reported rudder malfunction happened approximately a month after an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 Max lost a door plug during climbout from Portland International Airport (KPDX) in Oregon. No one was injured, however, the incident led to the grounding of the aircraft. Boeing has been under intense scrutiny from the FAA and NTSB since the event, with both agencies focusing on the manufacturer’s safety culture.

“We appreciate the NTSB’s work on this preliminary report and will continue to fully support their investigation,” a Boeing spokesperson told FLYING. “We worked closely with United Airlines to diagnose the rudder response issue observed during two 737-8 flights in early February. With coordination with United, the issue was successfully resolved with the replacement of three parts, and the airplane returned to service last month.”

The NTSB noted the report is still preliminary, and the information may change as the investigation continues.

The post NTSB Investigates Boeing Rudder Malfunction Incident in Newark appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to local broadcast news outlets, there were five people on board the Bombardier Challenger 600 which was flying from Ohio State University Airport (KOSU) in Columbus to Naples, then intended to continue on to Fort Lauderdale. The aircraft had left Ohio around 12:30 p.m.

According to Robin King, director of communication with the Naples Airport Authority, the Challenger was on approach to the airport when the flight crew radioed the airport reporting they had lost power in both engines. That was the final transmission just before the accident at 3:10 p.m.

The airplane came down on the interstate which runs north-south. Authorities have not said if the fatalities were persons in cars or in the aircraft.

Video and photographs of the scene showed fire and black billowing smoke and lines of cars in backed up traffic. Authorities have closed down a six mile stretch of the highway. It is expected to stay closed for at least 24 hours.

According to the FAA, the aircraft registration number of the Bombardier Challenger 600 is N823KD, which according to FAA records is owned by East Shore Aviation LLC out of Fort Lauderdale. Initial reports quoted by the Tampa Bay Times indicate the aircraft was operated by Hop-a-Jet Worldwide Charter.

The FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board are investigating the accident.

This is a developing story. More information will be published as it becomes available.

The post At Least 2 Killed in Florida Challenger Accident appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

These were the words of Richard McSpadden Jr., who was aboard the Cessna 177RG Cardinal belonging to former NFL tight end turned FBO owner Russ Francis. The pair launched from the airport in Lake Placid, New York, on October 1 for a photo flight for the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. McSpadden, the senior vice president of the AOPA Air Safety Institute, was a commercially rated pilot who had flown with the Air Force Thunderbirds.

Per protocol on these flights, Francis, as the owner of the airplane, would do the takeoff and landing, and Spad would take the controls for the air-to-air portion of the flight.

According to witnesses, the engine of the Cardinal surged during the takeoff and did not sound like it was making full power, yet the takeoff continued. The aircraft was in the air and out of usable runway when it turned and headed back to the airport. The runway is on top of a berm—the airplane came down in the ravine below its edge. Both men were alive and talking to rescuers, then moments later, they had passed away. The National Transportation Safety Board is still investigating the accident.

This hit me hard because I often talked with McSpadden about aircraft accidents and the importance of teaching and practicing the loss of thrust on takeoff. Although we still don’t know what caused the problem aboard the aircraft, there is a strong takeaway from this accident: if it could happen to Spad—Thunderbird Number One with all his training and experience—it could happen to any of us.

Briefing for LOTOTO

I have written far too many stories about fatal accidents that were attributed to an uncommanded loss of engine power. Often the accident happens because the pilot fails to maintain the appropriate speed as indicated on the aircraft’s emergency checklist—or worse yet, pulls back on the stick or yoke trying to stretch the glide, resulting in a stall-spin-die scenario.

A variation of this is when the pilot, trying to return to the runway, puts the aircraft into a steep bank resulting in a loss of vertical lift and a knife-edge impact in the ground.

While the procedure for engine loss at altitude is taught as an emergency usually before first solo, many pilots are not taught to brief the takeoff. That means a review of rotation speed, calling airspeed alive, and procedures if there is a loss of power on takeoff, until they begin their multi-engine training. This is a disservice to the aviation community.

Granted, in a twin, the loss of engine power on one side is dramatic in a different way, as it results in asymmetrical thrust, and the nose yaws and toward the dead engine. If the aircraft has lifted off, the asymmetrical thrust results in an uncommanded and often unrecoverable roll toward the sick engine resulting in a crash. Unless you bring the power on both engines back immediately and pitch for the appropriate V speed, you probably won’t live to tell the story.

In a single engine aircraft, a loss of engine power isn’t necessarily going to be fatal—as long as the pilot takes prompt and corrective action to maintain airspeed and has someplace to put it down.

Know the Speed You Need

There have been fledgling pilots who ask with some trepidation if a loss of engine power during takeoff is common. The answer is no, but knowing what to do if it does happen is like knowing how to put out a grease fire in your kitchen—you do not have time to experiment and an improper procedure like using water on the fire—or pulling back on the yoke or stick—can make a bad situation worse.

In the aircraft, you need to know what airspeed to pitch for. This is critical.

This speed will vary by make, model, and configuration. This information comes from the pilot’s operating handbook or aircraft flight manual and may even be placarded in the aircraft.

The pilot should also note rotation speed, and do the takeoff calculation before getting into the airplane, noting runway condition, temperature, and pressure.

Knowing what performance to expect helps you determine when a takeoff is going poorly and should be aborted. Identify an abort point. For example, if you calculate based on given conditions that you will need 1,130 feet to lift off from that 3,600-foot runway and you’re approaching 2,000 feet and you’re not up yet and the tachometer shows less than full power, abort.

Quick Reference Cards

If you fly multiple aircraft you may find it handy to make notes for each one and keep them with you for review before a flight in a particular airplane.

The first flight school I worked at had more than 10 Cessna 172s of varying models. The older models had airspeed indicators in miles per hour, the rest of the fleet was in knots. This could and did result in confusion that came back to bite a few pilots. I didn’t want to be one of them, so I wrote out the emergency speeds and V speeds for each aircraft on 3 x 5 notecards and carried them in a pouch worn around my neck that also held my airport ID. I did a quick review of the speeds for the aircraft I was assigned before each flight. 

The speed to maintain during a loss of engine power on takeoff was the big one—a knot or two could make a difference in the outcome of a situation, and I had no desire to be Junior Test Pilot in the event of an uncommanded loss of engine power, especially when I had someone sitting next to me counting on me to keep them safe.

Verbalize the Procedures

The loss of thrust or control on takeoff is part of my pre-takeoff briefing. It is concise and to the point:

If during the takeoff roll there is anything abnormal, be it an issue with controllability or engine power, we will bring the power to idle and come to a stop on the runway, then assess.

If the aircraft has lifted off and there is usable runway ahead, we will pitch for (insert speed here after verifying with checklist), land on the runway, and assess.

If the aircraft has lifted off and is out of usable runway, we will pitch for (insert speed here) and aim straight ahead or a gentle turn of no more than 30 degrees off the runway centerline aiming for someplace unpopulated, soft, and inexpensive.

Should You Turn Back?

Turning back to the runway can be a dicey situation. It is one of those scenarios I frequently practice in the ATD. If the aircraft is at least 1,000 feet agl, and the aircraft is light enough, it may be possible. It might even be doable at 800 to 700 feet. Always have an idea of where you will put it down if getting back to the runway is not an option—is there an open area of the extended centerline you could land in? An empty parking lot? Trees? A swamp? A road or street? To be clear: I am not a big fan of trying to put it down on a road or street because of power poles, cars, and street signs, however, the law of gravity cannot be denied, so do your best not to endanger anyone else.

In a Two-Pilot Situation

When flying with another pilot, the loss of thrust or controllability on takeoff briefing needs to include who will be pilot flying, because two pilots fighting over the controls is not going to help. One pilot should be pilot flying, the other should be making the radio calls if appropriate and time permits. “I will be pilot flying, you will back me up on the radio,” is the phrase to use.

Oddly, there are some CFIs that say this loss of thrust/control briefing is unnecessary and doesn’t do anything but scare the learners. I disagree—and so do the learners, like the one with the Cessna 150 who noted a lack of rpm on takeoff despite the throttle set to full power and aborted before he ran out of runway and options at the same time. Airport Mom was proud.

The post Loss of Thrust on Takeoff appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The wrongful death suit was filed by law firms Stritmatter Kessler Koehler Moore and Wisner Baum on behalf of Precup. King County, Washington, names Textron Aviation Inc., Mistequay Group Ltd. (Aeromotion by Textron Aviation), Ace Aviation Inc., Raisbeck Engineering Inc., and “John Doe one through ten” as defendants. These are the businesses that designed, manufactured, and maintained the Cessna Caravan.

As previously reported by FLYING and according to the preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the right wing separated from the aircraft during flight.

• READ MORE: NTSB Releases Details of Caravan Crash That Killed 4

About the Mission

The purpose of the flight was to test Raisbeck Engineering’s aerodynamic reduction system. Precup, 33, was working for Raisbeck as the instrumentation engineer during the test flights. The Raisbeck company makes modifications for corporate and business aircraft to improve performance and efficiency. The Caravan was on loan to Raisbeck Engineering. According to the complaint, the aircraft was owned by Copper Mountain Aviation LLC.

According to the NTSB, Raisbeck holds the supplemental type certificate (STC) for an aerodynamic drag reduction system (DRS) on the Cessna 208B. The purpose of the flight was to test the ability to expand the applicability of that DRS to the Cessna 208B EX model.

Raisbeck noted the flight was conducted prior to the installation of a Raisbeck modification, which is “standard industry practice that allows aviation engineering firms to establish baseline aircraft performance under a highly structured flight profile to later measure and compare the change in performance after any proposed modifications are installed. The aircraft was in this initial testing phase and had not yet been modified in any way.”

The accident happened during the last of a five-flight series to establish baseline performance. In addition to Precup, both pilots and the test director were killed. Several flights with several test pilots were completed in the days leading up to the accident.

The first flight took place on November 15 and consisted of three segments totaling 1.1 hours. The purpose of the flight was for the pilots to build familiarity with the aircraft and a ferry flight to have the airplane’s weight and balance performed. The next day the aircraft was flown for a total of 4.6 hours to establish baseline data for future test flights for both mid-center-of-gravity (CG) cruise flight and forward CG stall speeds. On November 17 two more test flights were completed, for a total of 1.2 hours to test the aft CG static stability. The last flight on the 17th was cut short with only half of the planned test maneuvers completed because a crewmember in the back of the airplane was feeling ill. 

The final flight took place the morning of November 18. The intention of the flight was to complete the test maneuvers from the prior day, which consisted of testing the aircraft’s stall performance.

The aircraft’s radar track shows it taking off from Renton Municipal Airport (KRNT) around 9:25 a.m. PST and heading north. The conditions were VFR as the airplane climbed to about 9,500 feet msl and began a series of turns. The airplane flew for approximately 45 minutes, its altitude varying between about 6,500 feet to 10,275 feet.

At 10:17 a.m., the track data showed the airplane in a climbing left turn. It was just about to complete a 360-degree turn when it abruptly entered a sharp 180-degree left turn to the west. The last 12 seconds of the radar capture show the airplane in a descent exceeding 14,000 fpm and gradually lessened to 8,700 fpm at the last report. The main wreckage was located about 2,145 feet east of the last recorded track data. The right wing was located some distance away.

The pilot who had flown the test flights the day before told investigators that it appeared that the flight crew were conducting the second-to-last maneuver on the card, which specified: 96 knots indicated airspeed; flaps in landing configuration; 930 foot-pounds of torque; propeller rpm fully forward; and accelerated 30-degree bank to the left. 

Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the airplane “fall apart” in midair then corkscrew to the ground. The event was captured by a security camera, and several witnesses reported seeing a white plume of smoke when they observed the airplane break into pieces. The fuselage appeared to be rotating about its longitudinal axis in a nose-low attitude.

Investigators noted that the right wing was found 200 yards from the main wreckage. The main wreckage, consisting of the engine, cockpit (and cargo pod), cabin, vertical stabilizer, and rudder, was partially consumed by fire. The right-wing strut had separated from the fuselage attachment point but remained attached to the wing. The right flap was separated into numerous pieces and scattered among the debris field. The left wing separated from the fuselage, although it was located adjacent to the main wreckage. The flap remained attached and was found in the retracted position.

The NTSB is still investigating the cause of the accident.

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