Answer: Kudos to you for wanting to be proactive and doing your homework. A dirty or scratched windshield can be a potential safety hazard, and replacing a windscreen that was scratched by poor cleaning technique is not something you want to deal with. It can cost thousands of dollars in supplies and labor. If the aircraft is on leaseback to a flight school, it could also lead to a loss of revenue.

• READ MORE: How Do You Know When to Descend?

Windscreen Cleaning Tips

Plain water and a clean microfiber cloth are a good start. Rinse the windscreen first, then gently stroke it from top to bottom with a clean cloth. By clean, I mean fresh out of the pack. Don’t press hard and do not scrub in circles. Plexiglass, which is what the windscreen is made of, is relatively soft and you could put permanent swirl marks into it.

If you drop the cloth on the ground during the process, don’t use it again. It may have picked up a piece of grit that could scratch the windscreen.

Also, do not use a paper towel as it is too abrasive.

• READ MORE: Should I File an Initial Approach Fix?

Use a ladder to be sure you can safely reach the entire windscreen. Take care not to let any buttons, zippers, or other metal, such as a belt buckle, ring, or watchband, scratch the windscreen.

Do not use Windex on airplane windscreens—ever. The ammonia in Windex can weaken and compromise the plexiglass and give it a hazy appearance.

• READ MORE: How Do You Check NOTAMs?

Prist is a brand of cleaner made for aircraft windscreens. Follow the directions on the bottle. For stubborn dirt or smashed bugs, let the Prist soak in a bit before you begin to wipe up and down. Use gentle strokes.

Side note: Never use Prist on car windows because they are made from safety glass, which will become hazy when treated with the product. It becomes like a layer of soap and is a challenge to remove.

The post Should You Clean an Airplane Windscreen Before Every Flight? appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

In an exclusive interview Tuesday night on NBC Nightly News, Sam Salehpour said he’ll tell a Senate committee on Wednesday he believes the aircraft are in danger of coming apart because of out-of-spec gaps where major assemblies are joined.

“The entire fleet worldwide, as far as I’m concerned right now, needs attention,” he told NBC’s Tom Costello. “And the attention is, you need to check your gaps and make sure that you don’t have potential for premature failure.”

• READ MORE: Boeing to Face Senate Scrutiny Amid Safety Concerns, Whistleblower Allegations

Salehpour was an engineer on the Dreamliner program but has since been assigned to work on the 777. He went public with his warning last week, and Boeing was quick to discount it.

“We are fully confident in the 787 Dreamliner. These claims about the structural integrity of the 787 are inaccurate and do not represent the comprehensive work Boeing has done to ensure the quality and long-term safety of the aircraft,” Boeing said in a statement last week. “The issues raised have been subject to rigorous engineering examination under FAA oversight.”

The improperly shimmed gaps were first found more than five years ago, and the FAA stopped deliveries of the 787 while Boeing came up with a fix. The existing fleet at the time was inspected and repaired, and new aircraft were presumably built to spec.

Salehpour said those repairs were not adequate and there is a danger of fatigue failure. Boeing said the fix has been thoroughly vetted and “these issues do not present any safety concerns” or durability problems. It said it will be on the lookout for problems, noting it encourages employees to “speak up” about any safety concerns.

“Retaliation is strictly prohibited at Boeing,” the statement said. The FAA says it is investigating the allegations.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post Boeing Whistleblower Wants 787 Fleet Grounded appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

These interactive CO detectors would provide both an auditory and visual warning when CO is present. 

How common is CO poisoning?

You learn about the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning as a student pilot. This odorless, colorless, and tasteless gas is a byproduct of combustion—and it is deadly. 

According to the NTSB, “Between 1982 and 2020 there were 31 accidents attributed to CO poisoning.

Twenty-three of those accidents were fatal, killing 42 people and seriously injuring four more.” 

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The incidence of CO poisoning is more frequent in the winter as cabin heat is used more than it is other times of the year. In many GA aircraft, cabin heat is produced by ducting outside air flow over the exhaust manifold to warm it, then opening a mechanical door to the cabin to bring the warm air inside. If there’s a crack in the manifold or duct work, carbon monoxide can enter the cabin.

One of the first signs of CO poisoning is sleepiness. Other symptoms include a headache, dizziness, nausea, shortness of breath, weakness, and confusion. As these symptoms can be attributed to other causes—such as a cardiac event or dehydration—the pilot can become incapacitated before they realize what is happening.

Carbon Monoxide Detection

There are many carbon monoxide detectors on the market. Among them are one-time-use, cardboard, easy-to-install devices that cost less than $10. These devices attach to the instrument panel or sidewall with adhesive.

The device uses a chemically activated sensor that darkens when carbon monoxide is present.

In theory, the pilot would notice the color change, shut off the cabin heat, open the vents to get fresh air, and land the aircraft as soon as possible.  

However, sometimes the pilot doesn’t notice the color change.

The interactive CO detectors that the NTSB pushes for have both an auditory alarm as well as a light to warn the pilot. These units are often battery powered and are reusable. They are more expensive than the one-time-use devices. Cost can range from about $40 to upward of $100. They’re available at pilot supply stores, and they’re also easy to install or use as a portable device.

The NTSB is asking the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) along with the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) to reach out to their membership about the dangers of CO poisoning and to encourage them to invest in the interactive CO detectors, while making inspection of the aircraft exhaust system a priority during maintenance.

The post NTSB to FAA: Make Interactive Carbon Monoxide Detectors Mandatory appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Accident and incident chains usually follow a similar pattern when a number of innocent errors stack to create an event. Despite 4,400 hours of total flight time, nearly three quarters of which had been logged in Cessna Citation CJs, a US-registered aircraft N680KH nearly got away from its pilot during an April 2019 incident near Bournemouth, England. A follow-up investigation showed the pilot simply did not read a critical AFM supplement, despite a close call just a month before.

The incident reported on by the UK’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), nearly cost the 73-year old ATP-rated pilot and his three passengers their lives, though he eventually managed to land the aircraft safely. The pilot purchased N680KH just a month before the incident and successfully completed factory-sponsored training.

The AAIB said, “The aircraft had been modified with an active-camber winglet system intended to enhance its performance, which included supplementary control surfaces designed to deflect symmetrically and automatically to alleviate gust loads.” The performance-enhancing winglet system, known as Atlas, was manufactured by Sandpoint, Idaho-based Tamarack Aerospace.

Not long after departing Bournemouth on April 19, with the CJ level at 3,000 feet and 258 kias, the pilot later told investigators he felt a slight vibration in the aircraft just as a red “Atlas Inop Limit 140 kias” warning illuminated on the instrument panel. Unknown to the pilot, an internal electrical system of the active winglet had failed which caused the aircraft to quickly roll to the left as it also began to descend. Full right aileron and right rudder had no effect, and neither did popping the Atlas circuit breaker. The pilot reduced power to idle and said he used two hands on the control column to try and right the aircraft.

The AAIB report said, “Recorded data showed that a bank angle alert was generated at around [a] 60 degree roll, and there was a sharp increase in normal acceleration, which reached [positive] 2.65 g. The aircraft’s roll angle peaked at 75 degree left wing down, with 9 degree nose down pitch, 19 seconds after the onset of the roll. Its rate of descent peaked soon after at 4,500 ft/min, corresponding with an airspeed of 235 kias, reaching a minimum altitude of 2,300 ft.”

The pilot said it took all his strength to lift the aircraft’s nose, reduce its airspeed, and reduce the bank angle to 30 degrees left wing down. He managed to climb the aircraft back up to 3,200 feet as the airspeed slowed to 144 kias. It was then that the airplane entered another left descending turn. Luckily, the weather was good VFR at Bournemouth where the pilot entered a left downwind for Runway 8. The aircraft descended as low as 300 feet agl on downwind while the pilot used full right aileron and some right rudder all the way to touchdown.

The AAIB’s investigation discovered the TACS computer control unit in the left winglet had failed due to a screw that have worked itself loose and shorted a circuit board. The TACS control unit on the right winglet tested OK. The Board also learned that a Tamarack supplement to the CJ’s aircraft flight manual contained a procedure to address this specific type of failure, a document the pilot admitted he’d never read. However, the AAIB said despite the AFM supplement’s existence, it “did not adequately characterize the significance of the system failure, nor address the failure in all anticipated flight conditions. Certification flight tests of the system [also] did not reveal the severity of possible outcomes.”

While inspecting the aircraft, an AAIB investigator located the AFM in the back of the aircraft where it would have been unavailable to the pilot in flight had he wanted to refer to it. The AFM supplement included the first critical emergency steps required to deal with an electrical failure of the Tamarack winglets; “reduce power and deploy the speed brakes to slow the aircraft below 140 knots.” The incident aircraft’s speed exceeded that called for in the AFM supplement by more than 100 knots. Tamarack explained these two steps were more important that trying to right the airplane. Initial certification of the Tamarack winglets also reported the importance of slowing the aircraft in order to maintain control. The pilot knew none of this.

EASA issued an Emergency AD on the same day as the April incident while the FAA took a little longer. The FAA issued an AD grounding all Cessna Citation CJ 525, 525A and 525B with the Atlas system installed warning pilots a malfunction could lead to a total loss of aircraft control. In October 2019, Tamarack filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy at the same time announcing plans to soon reemerge. In July 2019, the company’s products were approved for an alternative means of compliance that effectively removed the grounding directive from all aircraft.

The AAIB investigation also discovered something shocking, that the pilot had a month earlier experienced another Atlas failure, but never reported the incident. He said during the earlier event, the Atlas fail button illuminated as the aircraft banked about 50 degrees (the report did not indicate in which direction). After five seconds the light went out and the aircraft again flew normally. Since the aircraft was again operating normally, the pilot did not investigate any further, nor did he bother to acquaint himself with the emergency procedures in the AFM, if he knew they existed.

Before purchasing the incident airplane, however, the pilot received a pre-buy report indicating the Atlas system had been installed as well as a mention of the AFM supplement. A previously issued service bulletin calling for replacement of the TACS computers was never complied with and was never mentioned in the report because scope of the pre-buy apparently did not include a search for any outstanding SBs.

The AAIB issued four safety recommendations following this incident, primary of which was to specifically warn pilots of how severe a failure might become if the specified procedures were not followed. It also asked both EASA and the FAA to review the additional training pilots operating a Tamarack aircraft should receive before they were allowed to act as PIC because this pilot’s instinctive reaction, while considered understandable, was much different from the way the system test pilot had experienced things.

On December 3, 2020, Tamarack published a number of rebuttal arguments on its website related to the Bournemouth incident, including that the pilot’s initial incident report contained inaccuracies that ultimately grounded the fleet of Tamarack-modified aircraft for a short time. “The pilot reported his Citation rolled 90 degrees in one second. Data captured from the incident showed the roll rate was approximately four degrees per second which aligns with what Tamarack reported in its failure recovery procedures. The Citation’s initial roll also went uncorrected by the pilot for some 19 seconds, an issue the pilot later could not explain.” Tamarack also pointed to the service bulletin it had issued on the TACS computers a year prior to the incident—one the company offered to operators at no cost—that the company said would have prevented the 2019 incidents aboard N680KH.

This incident serves as yet another reminder of the need to learn for aircraft buyers to learn the entire story behind their specific aircraft before they accept delivery, as well as the need to look deeper into system failures when they first appear.

The post Tamarack Responds to AAIB Report About 2019 CJ1 Incident appeared first on FLYING Magazine.