During the summit, I shared a table with David St. George, designated pilot examiner and executive director of the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators. St. George noted that most flight instructors teach for about a year before they move on. They often train through accelerated programs, where the goal is to meet the requirements and pass the check ride in as little time as possible. This “hurry-up-and-get-it-done” model is repeated by these instructors. Stereotypical behavior includes “check-the-box instruction,” where the flight is performed to meet the certificate requirements. Other behaviors include a minimum of ground time spent with the learner and pushing weather boundaries and learner fatigue levels to keep the Hobbs meter running.

The aviation community has been buzzing lately about a fatal accident in Kentucky in September that took the life of a 22-year-old instructor and an 18-year-old learner. The event gathered a lot of attention online because the CFI, who had a pronounced social media presence, chronicled the flight through Snapchat in a series of public remarks demeaning the learner. The CFI’s last post documented the line of thunderstorms they flew into that ultimately tore the aircraft to pieces.

According to the preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), on September 27, CFI Timothy McKellar Jr. and private pilot candidate Connor Quisenberry intended to fly a Piper PA-28-161 from Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) on a VFR flight plan to Bowling Green-Woodhurst Airport (KBWG). The Snapchat story begins with McKellar talking to the camera and shaking his head along with a caption disparaging the student. Then the camera angle reverses to show Quisenberry, flashlight and checklist in hand, performing the preflight inspection of the Warrior.

• READ MORE: Practice Crosswind Landings Whenever You Can

McKellar shows himself drumming his fingers on the outside of the airplane and expressing impatience with Quisenberry who “wanted to have a conversation” when McKellar wants to get the flight over with because he has to be up at 4:30 a.m. The time stamp of the Snapchat shows 8:39 p.m. as McKellar is heard saying, “C’mon.” They have a three-hour flight ahead.

McKellar’s comments, along with FlightAware’s capture of nine takeoffs and landings at the destination airport, seem to indicate this flight was intended to meet the night training requirement for the private certificate. The NTSB report did not indicate if either McKellar or Quisenberry obtained a weather briefing prior to the flight. A review of TAFs and METARs from the area shows a probability of convective activity, including warnings of lightning “in all quadrants.” Given this information, the decision to make the flight at all is puzzling.

According to social media posts, McKellar did most of his training at ATP, the largest accelerated training program in the U.S. He held CFI, CFII, and MEI certificates. Some graduates of accelerated programs may not know how to teach beyond the test because that’s how they were trained. They exhibit rote learning rather than understanding and application. Correlation—the level of learning that requires the learner to perform real-world tasks and exhibit in-depth knowledge—is often missing in these cases.

The Snapchat video continues showing the night takeoff and some moments in cruise flight. McKellar’s decision to record the takeoff—one of the critical moments of flight—also raised a few eyebrows among experienced instructors because that’s when things can go wrong quickly.

• READ MORE: When You Go Back to Flight School, Don’t Lose What You’ve Learned

At 22:15, approximately one hour after takeoff, McKellar posted an annotated weather image from a mobile-device-based aviation navigation tool. The image shows the airplane’s position northwest of Bowling Green, along with the planned route of flight back to KOWB. Radar imagery was also displayed in the image, marked with a circle around the flight track and nearby returns, and a comment from McKellar about the storms approaching like “pissed-off hornets.” The storms are approximately 15 miles away.

The NTSB report includes a screen grab of the post with attention called to the location of the approaching storms, airplane’s position (blue airplane icon), planned route of flight (magenta line), and depicted imagery with the storms circled in red on either side of the route line.

ATC warned of heavy to extreme precipitation to the aircraft’s 9 o’clock. ADS-B data showed that the airplane continued its northwesterly course, and FlightAware displayed some extreme altitude fluctuations. About two minutes later, McKellar requested an IFR clearance. ATC told them to head east. McKellar advised ATC that the airplane was “getting blown around like crazy.” The airplane’s flight track showed a turn to the northwest, followed by a right circling turn. The controller reiterated the heading of 090 degrees. McKellar replied that they were in “pretty extreme turbulence.”

There were no further comms. The last ADS-B position was recorded at 22:49 at an altitude of 2,200 feet. The wreckage, described by the NTSB as a “debris field,” was spread over 25 acres in a hilly, densely wooded area. The aircraft was torn in half with the forward fuselage, including the cockpit, engine, and right wing, located together in the most westerly portion of the debris field. The stabilator was torn chordwise just outboard of the hinges, with the right side located 1,500 feet away from the fuselage. The NTSB did not uncover any preaccident anomalies or malfunctions.

McKellar’s family has defended his actions, saying he was joking with the learner and that he demanded excellence from the pilots he flew with. CFIs are supposed to model professionalism for their learners. Posting on social media during a flight, especially demeaning your learner, is not demonstrating professionalism. Nor is recognizing approaching thunderstorms and flying into them.

All CFIs become frustrated with their learners from time to time, especially when they fail to meet expectations, but good CFIs focus on ways to help them improve. It may mean developing a different approach to the task or even suggesting a change of instructor. Shaming the learner on social media is not how to do it.

The Kentucky accident will likely become a lesson in hazardous attitudes (macho, invulnerability, etc.) and risk identification for future aviators. It is too bad that two families had to lose their sons for this.

At most colleges and trade schools, the instructors have spent years in the industry they are teaching. They often have decades of experience in the field before they step into the classroom. In the aviation world, it is backward. We expect someone with the least amount of experience, often approximately 300 hours, to teach the next generation of pilots.

The question now is how do we encourage more instructors to teach longer so they have a chance to build experience? More money is my first thought, but if the CFI doesn’t enjoy teaching, it will be the students who suffer.

One of the sobering messages from the NAFI Summit was if we continue to have the less experienced, less committed instructors training the bulk of future pilots, we can likely expect more accidents caused by failure to identify and mitigate risk in pursuit of hours.

This column first appeared in the December 2023/Issue 944 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Who Is Teaching? Low Time and Social Media Make for a Bad Combo appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Maybe you’ve read Chapter 17 of the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge and Chapter 11 of the Airplane Flying Handbook, learning about the dangers of spatial disorientation and runway illusions caused by the reduction of visual cues. Most of us read along the way, too, about the black hole approach, where a lack of visual cues on the ground make it challenging for the pilot to find the runway and fly a stable approach. Oddly enough, the other side of the black hole approach—the black hole departure—that can make takeoffs challenging and sometimes downright deadly does not receive the same amount of attention.

Perhaps it’s time that it did.

Accident at KVNC

On April 5, a commercial pilot flying a Piper Cherokee Lance took off from Venice Municipal Airport (KVNC) in Florida, destined for Albert Whitted Airport (KSPG) in St. Petersburg under a full moon. The airport sports two runways, 13/31 and 5/23. Noise-sensitive communities surround the airport, and the recommendation is that pilots use Runway 23 at night and follow a noise abatement procedure that has them maintain runway heading and climb to 1,000 feet msl at best rate of climb (VY) before heading on their way. The airport is located on the west coast of Florida, and Runway 23 puts the aircraft over the Gulf of Mexico.

The weather at the time of the flight was reported as 10 miles visibility and clear. However, security camera footage of the takeoff showed there was no discernible horizon over the dark waters of the Gulf.

According to the data track provided by the FAA, the aircraft reached an altitude of approximately 300 feet and a ground speed of about 103 knots then began a turn to the right and entered a descent. The aircraft hit the water at 136 knots and a vertical descent rate of approximately 3,000 fpm, killing the pilot and all three passengers.

While it will take several months for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to determine the probable cause of the accident, the black hole nature of the departure environment is already under review.

“This accident really drove home how insidious VFR night flight can be,” said the late Richard McSpadden, former Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) senior vice president and executive director of its Air Safety Institute (ASI).

Recently, the ASI took an in-depth look at this accident.

“The departure is more of a risk than the approach is, because on the approach the pilot is already on instruments,” said McSpadden in October 2023, explaining that during black hole approaches the pilot is carefully watching the airspeed indicator, heading indicator, attitude indicator, and altimeter to maintain situational awareness. “On departure, the pilot may not be expecting to be on instruments, then the darkness comes at them rather quickly—and they are not ready to transition.”

McSpadden flew the Runway 23 departure at KVNC at night to have a better understanding of the challenge. “When you take off, the coastline is at an angle,” he said. “The way the coastline falls away, you are truly completely dark really quickly, as you are over the water.”

Many pilots don’t recognize the challenge of the black hole departure, according to David St. George, the exec-utive director of the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators, a 21,000-hour charter pilot, and a designated pilot examiner. “Taking off into a black hole (dark night) is like flying into the belly of a whale—no references,” St. George said. One of the scenarios he uses for check rides is having the applicant plan a night flight that includes a black hole departure, such as out of Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF) in Florida. “First, to see if they plan a direct flight over water,” St. George said, “second, to see if they detect the hazards of departure. The airman certification standards are all about risk management.”

Over-water departures aren’t the only challenging ones, said St. George, adding that departures over dark and featureless mountainous terrain also pose challenges. McSpadden suggested that instructors prepare learners for these situations by teaching them to use the instruments during night flight because “the lack of horizon can be disorientating, and if it happens at low altitude, you are in serious trouble because the surprise factor limits reaction time.” He believed pilots should practice black hole departures in an aviation training device so they understand how to use the instruments to maintain aircraft control.

Taking McSpadden’s advice, I decided to give it a try. Using the NTSB preliminary report as a guide, I re-created the accident at KVNC in a Redbird FMX advanced aviation training device, right down to the time, date, and weather. I used a large, black tarp to block out exterior light.

McSpadden was correct—when the aircraft passes over the shoreline and the lights fall away, it is disorienting, and you need to get on the gauges quickly, just as you do for an IFR departure.

Practice Going on the Gauges

Spatial disorientation is defined as the lack of orientation with regard to the position, attitude, or movement of the airplane in space. Pilots are prone to spatial disorientation if they rely on their vestibular system (the organs in the inner ear), the somatosensory system (also known as the “seat-of-the-pants” sensation), and visual system without identifying a horizon.

In short, your body becomes confused between acceleration forces that result from gravity and maneuvering the aircraft. This can, and often does, lead to spatial disorientation. You may feel like the airplane is in straight-and-level flight when actually it is nose-high attitude and turning to the left.

Just as pilots train to identify and recover from unusual attitudes, it can behoove you to practice experiencing spatial disorientation and flying the aircraft by instruments. Do this with the help of an instructor and at appropriate altitude. You could put on a view-limiting device then close your eyes and tilt your head forward while the instructor puts the aircraft through climbs, turns, and descents to ensure you’re appropriately disoriented. Then the instructor can have you attempt to hold the aircraft on an assigned heading while climbing at V_Y. An exercise like this demonstrates how the body can lie to you, and it gives you confidence in using the instruments.

• READ MORE: Flying at Night: What You Need to Know

Safely in the Black Hole

There are a handful of tips you can follow to help mitigate risk when you face a potential black hole departure, though these practices and procedures help any takeoff profile. First, before you taxi onto the runway, make sure the altimeter is set to the field elevation.

In your regular flying, practice V_X and V_Y climbs in day VFR conditions, noting the pitch angles on the attitude indicator for reference at night.

Study the sectional, airport guide, and Google Earth images of the area around the airport before you take off for better situational awareness. You can also use tools in apps like ForeFlight and Garmin Pilot to visualize terrain and obstacles in unfamiliar areas. Note the elevation of obstacles near the airport and determine what altitude the aircraft will have to be at to safely pass over them.

This last tip was impressed upon me as a CFI candidate taking off from Norm Grier Field (S36), a nontowered airport in Kent, Washington. The runway, 15/33, measures 3,288 feet by 40 feet with low intensity runway lights. The airport is surrounded by 30- to 40-foot trees, and on the north and south ends there are power lines that run perpendicular to the runway.

“You need to be at 650 feet to clear the wires,” my CFI told me.

He was correct.

Getting Out of the Hole

• Check that the altimeter is set to field elevation before takeoff.
• Practice climbs at V_x and V_y in day VFR conditions.
• Study the lay of the land via the sectional, Google Earth, ForeFlight terrain awareness, or other apps.
• Note the elevation of obstacles and high-terrain points in the departure path—and all
  quadrants in case of an ATC vector or traffic avoidance course change.
• If you have access to a desktop flight sim or AATD, set up a black hole departure at one of the airports noted (KVNC, KSPG, or KVDF) and experience the process.

This feature first appeared in the October 2023/Issue 942 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Respect the Darkness of the Black Hole Departure appeared first on FLYING Magazine.